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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem: 
Following the bitter experience of the 1 9 3 0 s and 
the Second World War, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) came into existence in 1944 to facilitate the 
expansion and balanced growth of international trade 
and to contribute thereby to the promotion and 
maintenance of high levels of employment and real 
income and to the development of the productive 
resources of all members as primary objectives of 
economic policy. 
In the inter-war period exchange restrictions and 
competitive devaluations had been widely used in pursuit 
of trade and employment objectives; and inevitably, 
resort to the use of such national policy instruments led 
to retaliatory measures on the part of the trading 
par tners . At the same time, inadequate international 
liquidity had contributed substantially to the economic 
difficulties 6i the 1930s. The World trade and investment 
suffered badly. Under such a situation, there developed 
the need for increased international co-operation in 
money, finance and trade. "The leading industrial nations 
especially wanted to avoid reoccurrence of the 
competitive exchange rate depreciations, "beggar-my-
neighbour" trade restrictions, and deflationary measures 
that had been adopted in the 1930s to meet balance-
of-payment problems. Pledged to under take full-
employment policies after the war. the countries now 
wanted to be free to pursue domestic expansion, 
unconstrained by the balance of payments."^ To achieve 
this goal, a conference of financial experts and delegates 
from 44 countries of the world was held on July. 1. 
1944 in Bretton Woods. New Hempshire, USA. This 
conference proposed the establishment of the IMF. the 
World Bank and an International Trade Organisation 
(ITO). The ITO. however, could not be established while 
the IMF and the World Bank took birth. The IMF became 
operational in 1947 with the objectives of providing 
'machinery for consultation and collaboration on 
international monetary problems", promotion of stable 
and orderly exchange rate through its par value system 
and the provision of short-term finance to discourage 
resor t to measures des t ruct ive of nat ional or 
international prosperity (e.g. inappropriate resort to 
deflation and devaluation or protection) in response to 
payments imbalances. 
Developing countries faced with the wide foreign 
exchange gap have sought financial assistance from the 
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fund to bridge the gap and speed up the tempo of the 
development programmes. The IMF has also developed 
a number of facilities for lending over the years. 
However, the fund's resources are made available to 
borrowing nations on fulfilment of certain policy 
conditions only. These conditions broadly include 
conditions on the utilisation of the loan and conditions 
for change in the macroeconomic policies of the 
government of the borrowing country concerned. The 
later category relate to deregulation, privatisation and 
freedom for market forces to operate in respect of 
production, prices and investment. 
The policy conditions are known as "conditionality" 
and has been a topic of animated discussion among 
economists and political leaders. Some has regarded it 
as the unique and distinctive feature of the F u n d s 
assistance in view of the revolving nature of its resources 
while others consider them as an act of interference by 
the Fund in the internal economic affairs of the 
borrowing nation. In India, too, the borrowings from IMF 
have been subjected to criticism on grounds such as the 
country's erosion of independence in the formulation of 
economic policies, accentuation of the payments 
difficulties, reversal of the direction of past policies etc. 
1 . 2 O b j e c t i v e s of the Study: 
In view of the above, our main objective in this study 
is to critically evaluate India's borrowings from the IMF 
over the period 1947-48 to 1996-97 . Within the 
framework of this broad objective, the specific objectives 
set out for the study are as follows: 
i. To give an account of the circumstances and 
the level of India's borrowings from the IMF 
during the period 1947-48 to 1996-97 ; 
ii. To assess the contribution of these borrowings in 
financing India's balance of payments deficit: and 
iii. To examine the validity of various criticisms 
that have been generally levelled against 
Ind ias borrowings from the IMF. 
1.3 Data Base and Methodology: 
The study is based mainly on secondary sources of 
data, which include publications of government. IMF as 
well as the publications of various authors. These 
sources have been duly acknowledgbed at appropriate 
places. 
The study covers the period 1947-48 to 1996-97 for 
which comparable data are readily available. The 
methodology used is largely analytical. 
1.4 Plan of the Study: 
The Plan of the study is as follows: Chapter -II 
briefly reviews the origin, objectives, functioning and 
evolution of the IMF since its inception. The relationship 
between India and the IMF is discussed in Chapter-Ill. 
India's borrowings from the IMF during the period 1947-
48 to 1996-97 are analysed in Chapter-IV. The analysis 
includes aspects such as the extent of India's recource 
to IMF borrowing to over come the BOPs deficits, and 
their implications for Indian economy in general. Finally 
Chapter-V presents the main conclusions of our study. 
Reference: 
1. Gerald M. Meier Problems of a World Monetary 
Order. Oxford Univesity Press. 1974 . p. 18. 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ORIGIN 
FUNCTIONING AND EVOLUTION 
2 . 1 Introduct ion: 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the origin, 
objectives and functioning of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) focussing on how the Fund has evolved over 
the years. The chapter is divided into eight sections and 
these covers: 2.2 Origin of the IMF . 2.3 Objectives and 
Functions. 2.4 Organisation, 2.5 Membership and 
Quotas, 2.6 Lending operations, 2.7 Evolution of the 
Fund, and 2.8 Concluding remarks. 
2 . 2 Origin of the IMF: 
As it is well known, the World War I brought the 
demise of the gold standard and the interwar period was 
characterised by chaotic conditions in international trade 
and finance. The Great Depression forced the monetary 
authority of the various countries to resort to various 
measures like exchange depreciat ion, fluctuating 
exchange rate, multiple currency practices, direct control 
over imports etc. to export their unemployment (begger 
thy neighbour policies). Consequently, the volume of 
world trade was affected severely. In fact between 1929 
and 1932 price collapsed and international trade fell to 
unprecidently low levels . These developments produced 
different effects on the economy of the various 
countries. The important ones may be listed as follows: 
(i) The terms of trade moved sharply against the 
primary commodities producing countries 
(ii) The burden of their foreign obligations increased 
due to a decline in their foreign exchange 
earnings leading to widespread defaults 
(iii) The primary product producing countries had to 
earn foreign exchange to import essential goods 
and they had to use foreign resources carefully The 
economies of the industrial countries reached a 
precarious position. There was a sharp rise in 
unemployment, specially in the United Kingdom 
Countr ies sought solution independently and 
individually many of them progressively introducing 
exchange controls and limiting imports through tariffs 
and quotas. In complete change of course, the United 
States was faced with two obstacles, one being the 
direct control over the trade and other being the 
instability of the exchange rates. 'More than anything 
else the United States required stable exchange rates 
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in order to secure widespread acceptance of its own 
policies as the leader in the world economy"^ 
The restrictions on multilateral trade and payments 
increased during the world war II. The enlightened public 
opinion and world statesmen feared that these restrictive 
trade and payment practices would continue after the 
War unless concerted international efforts were made to 
create some effective international machinery which 
could restore stability of exchange rate, prevent 
compet i t ive currency dep rec i a t i ons and remove 
restrictions on trade and capital movement etc This 
fear led the British economist John Maynard Keynes 
during the War to prepare a comprehensive plan of 
international monetary co-operation for implementation 
after the war. This plan came to be known as the 
"Keynes Plan" The other plan was prepared by the 
American expert Harry D. White and Called the 'White 
Plan", The basic features of these plans were taken 
together and merged into a common plan which was 
evolved at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference of 44 nations held at Bretton Woods. New 
Hampshire in the USA in July 1944 . The conference 
proposed the establishment of the Internat ional 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO). Of these, the 
IMF and the IBRD were established while the ITO could 
not be set up and a partial substitute the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established 
as an interim arrangement. 
The Articles of the Fund were agreed upon in 1944, 
it came into being in Dec. 1945 and started functioning 
in April 1 9 4 7 . The Fund aimed to provide exchange rate 
stability, temporary assistance to member countries 
falling short of foreign exchange and international 
sponsoring of measures for curbing fundamental 
disequilibrium or causes of fundamental disequilibrium in 
the balance of payments of countries. 
2 . 3 Objec t ive s and Funct ions: 
The objectives of the Fund^ are to provide exchange 
rate stability, to maintain orderly exchange management 
among members and to avoid competitive exchange rate 
changes. These objectives have been well set out in 
Article I of the Fund Agreement as under^-
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation 
through a permanent institution which provide 
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t h e m a c h i n e r y for c o n s u l t a t i o n and 
co l labora t ion on in t e rna t iona l m o n e t a r y 
problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth 
of international trade and to contribute thereby 
the promotion and maintenance of high levels 
of employment and real income and to the 
development of the productive resources of all 
members as primary objectives of economic 
policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain 
o rder ly e x c h a n g e a r r a n g e m e n t s a m o n g 
members, and to avoid competitive exchange 
depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral 
system of payments in respect of current 
transaction between member and in the 
elimination of foreign exchange restriction 
which hamper the growth of the world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the 
Fund resources temporarily available to them 
under adequate safeguards, thus providing 
them with opportunity to correct maladjustment 
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in their balance of payments (BoPs) without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or 
international prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the 
d u r a t i o n and l e s s en t h e d e g r e e of 
disequilibrium in the international balance of 
payments of members. 
in joining the Fund, each country agrees to 
cooperate with the above objectives. The IMF operates 
in such a way as to fulfill its objectives as laid down 
in Bretton Woods Article of Agreements. 
IMF performs three major functions'* which are 
discussed below: 
1. It serves as a short-term credit institution. If the 
member country is in need of getting assistance 
for improving its balance of payments the Fund 
helps such country. It does not supply all the 
foreign exchange requirements of countries but only 
partially. The country can borrow from the Fund 
for the specific purpose and have to reverse the 
transactions with interest on net withdrawals. 
2. It provides a mechanism for improving long term 
balance of payments position. The rules of the 
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Fund provide orderly adjustment of exchange rates 
No country can involve in competitive devaluation 
The Fund imposes conditions on the international 
monetary system. Whenever a country feels that its 
exchange rate is out of line, it can consult the Fund 
before effecting a change in the exchange rate 
3. It provides a mechanism for in te rna t iona l 
consultations. It brings together the representatives 
of the members of the Fund and provides an 
excellent opportunity for reconciling conflicting 
claims. These measures of international co-
operations are bound to have not only stabilizing 
influence on the world economy but also lead to 
the expansion of trade and output in the member 
countries. This is how it contributes to promotion 
and maintenance of high level of employment and 
real income 
2 . 4 Organ i sa t ion: 
The organisation of the IMF is described in Article 
XII of the Agreement and consists of Board of 
Governors. Executive Directors, a Managing director and 
staffs 
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The highest authority of the Fund is excercised by 
the Board of Governors \ on which each member country 
is represented by a Governor and an alternative 
Governor. The Board of Governors meets once a year, 
but the Governor may take votes by mail or other means 
between annual meetings. The Board of Governors has 
delegated many of its powers to the 24 Executive 
Directors in Washington, who are appointed or elected 
by individual member countries or group of countries. 
Each appointed Director has voting power proportionate 
to the quota of the govt, he or she represents, while 
each elected Director cast all the votes of the countries 
he / she represent.^ 
The Managing Director is selected by Executive 
Directors and serve as the Chairman of the Executive 
Board, but may not vote except in case of a tie. The 
term of office is for 5 years but may be extended or 
terminated at the discretion of the Executive Directors 
The Managing Director is responsible for the ordinary 
business of the IMF, under the direction of Executive 
Directors. Managing Director shall also be responsible 
for the organisation, appointment and the dismissal of 
the staff of IMF. 
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2 . 5 Membership and Q u o t a s ; 
The IMF consists of its original members and others. 
The originals are those countries which participated in 
the Bretton woods conference. The other members are 
those countries which latter became members in 
accordance with the terms prescribed by the IMF. The 
actual procedure is for such countries to request 
participation and present their request to the Board of 
Governors and for the Executive Directors then to decide 
upon the conditions (such as quotas and method of 
payments) which are then to be approved by the Board 
of Governors. If a member wishes to withdraw from the 
Fund, it is always possible for it to do so by advising 
the IMF authorities. At present the total membership of 
the Fund is 185.^ 
Quota: 
Each member joining the Fund was allotted a quota, 
that is a quantity of Funds to be paid into the IMF. The 
size of each member's quota was determined by a 
formula that took into account such factors as the 
country's national income, the variability of its exports , 
the ratio of its exports to national income. As a result. 
the more economically powerful countries enjoyed the 
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larger quotas. The sum of all quotas was $8 .8 billion 
in 1944 including the Soviet quota of $ 1.2 billion. But 
the USSR never, in fact, joined the Fund. The US has 
the dominant position in the Fund. 
At the time of its establishment, each member 
country was required to pay 25 per cent of its quota 
in terms of gold or US dollars and the balance in its 
national currency. But this practice of the gold reserves 
by the member countries was discontinued from April 
1978 and the IMF has been delinked from gold since 
then. Now the reserve asset portion of 25 percent is 
paid in special Drawing Right (SDR) or usable reserve 
currency. 
A country quota in the Fund determines her (i) 
subscription to the Fund, (ii) drawing rights on the Fund 
under both regular and special facilities, (iii) Voting 
power, and (iv) share of any allocation of the SDR. 
Quotas of all members are revised at intervals not longer 
than five years and take into account the adequacy of 
the Fund resources in fulfilling its responsibilities and 
reflect factors such as the growth of the world economy 
and changes in the relative size of the member countries. 
However any revision become effective only if it is 
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approved by a four fifths majority of the total voting 
power. The Articles of Agreement do not indicate how 
a member 's quota is to be determined. The quota 
increases are normally divided into two portions equi-
proportional and selective. The former is based on 
the shares of members in actual quotas while the later 
is based on the member's shares in calculated quotas. 
The calculated quotas are derived on the basis of quota 
formulas which have been revised over time as shown 
below''. 
Quota Formulas 
Original Bre t ton Woods Formula 
Q = (0.02 Y + 0.05 R + 0.10 M + 0.10 V) (1 + XA') 
Where. 
Q = calculated quotas 
Y = national income, 
M = gold and foreign exchange reserves 
X = average annual exports (five year average) 
M = average annual imports (five year average) 
V = maximum fluctuation in exports defined as the 
difference between highest and the lowest value 
of exports during a five year period. 
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Formulas for the Fourth through Seventh General 
Rev iews: 
Several important changes were introduced in the 
quota formulas at the time of the Fourth Review: 
a) the weights in the BrettonWoods formula were 
each reduced by 50 per cent, 
b) in addition to the Bretton Woods formula, four 
derivative formulas were introduced, 
c) all five formulas were calculated on the basis of 
two sets of data. Set. I data uses exports , 
imports and variability of exports and Set II data 
uses current payments, current receipts and 
variability of current receipts. 
Revised B r e t t o n Woods Formula 
Ql = (0.01 Y + 0.025 R + 0.05 M + 0.2276 V) (1 + X/Y) 
Ql" = (0.01 Y + 0.025 R + 0,05 P + 0.2276 VC) (1 + CAT 
Drivative Formulas : 
Scheme III: 
Q2 = (0.0065 Y + 0.078 M + 0.5065 V) (1 + XAO 
Q2- = (0.0065 Y + 0.078 P + 0.5065 VC) (1 + C/Y) 
Scheme IV: 
Q3 = (0.0045Y + 0.070 M + 0.9622 V) (1 + XA) 
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Q3- = (0.0045Y + 0.070 P + 0.9622 VC) (1 + C/Y) 
Scheme M4: 
Q4 = (0.005 Y + 0.044 M+ 0.044 X + 1.044 V) 
Q4 '= (0.005 Y + 0.044 P + 0.044 C +1.044 VC) 
Scheme M7: 
Q5 = (0.0045 Y + 0.039 M + 0.039 X + 1.304 V) 
Q5 '= (0.0045 Y + 0.039 P + 0.039 C + 1.304 VC) 
where, 
Qi = Quota calculated with Set I data, 
Qi' = Quota calculated with Set II data, 
P = Current payments, 
C = Current receipts, 
M = Imports, 
X = Exports, 
V = Variability of exports, 
VC = Variability of current receipts. 
Formulas for the Eighth and Ninth General 
Rev iews: 
At the time of the Eighth Review, the following 
changes were made: 
A) GDP replaced national income, 
b) foreign reserves was included in all of the derivative 
formulas, and measure of reserves was broadened 
to include SDRs and ECUS and redefined as a 
twelve month average rather than a year end level. 
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c) Set I calculations were dropped, and 
d) the co-efficient of variability was reduced by 20 per 
cent in the four derivative formulas. 
Bret ton Woods reduced formula: 
Ql = (0.01 Y + 0.025 R + 0.05 P + 0.2276 vc) (1 + c/y) 
Scheme 111: 
Q2 = (0.0065 Y + 0.0205125 R + 0.078 P + 0.4052 VC) 
(1 + C/Y) 
Scheme IV 
Q3 = (0.0045 Y + 0.03896768 R + 0.07 P + 0.76976 VC) 
(1+C/Y) 
Scheme M4: 
Q4 = (0.005 Y+0.042280464 R + 0.044 (P+C) + 0.8352 VC) 
Scheme M7: 
Q5 = (0.0045 Y + 0.5281008 R + 0.039 [P+C) + 1.0432 VC 
An adjustment factor is applied to each of the 
derivative formulas so that the totals derived under each 
formula at the time of a quota review equal that derived 
under the Bretton Woods formula. From the formulas, 
the calculated quota is derived as the higher of the result 
of Bretton Woods formula and the result obtained by 
averaging the two lowest results of the derivative 
formulas. 
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The quota formulas for the Eleventh Review (which 
is not yet concluded) have been kept the same as those 
used in the Ninth Review. 
S o u r c e : RBI Occassional Papers , Vol. 18, No. 2 & 3, 
Special issue (June & Sept), 1997 . 
Table-2.1 gives a comparative picture of the total 
increase in quotas under successive and General 
Reviews. 
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It can be seen from Table 2.1 that in the first two 
Reviews concluded in 1951 and 1958 respectively, no 
increase in the quotas was suggested. In a special 
Review done in 1958-59 all round increase of 50 per 
cent in quotas was agreed due to the heavy drawings 
made on the Fund. The Fourth (1965) and the Fifth 
(1970) Reviews led to lower increases in quotas 25 per 
cent each. Thereafter the quotas were raised by 32 .5 
per cent, 50 per cent, 47 .5 per cent and 50 per cent 
in the Sixth (1976), Seventh (1978), Eighth (1983) and 
Ninth (1990) Reviews respectively. No increase was 
however proposed in the Tenth Review. The total size 
of the quotas grew steadily over these years from a little 
over SDR 8 billion to more than SDR 144 billion 
Apart from the periodic revision of quotas, the IMF 
is authorised, under its Articles of Agreement, to 
supplement its ordinary resources by borrowing The 
first such attempt was made in January 1962 when 
quotas were supplemented by the Decision on 'General 
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB)". Under it ten leading 
countries (Belgium, Canada. France. Germany. Italy. 
Japan . The Netherland. Sweden. Great Britain and the 
United States of America) agreed to stand ready to lend 
upto $ 6 billion of their currencies for the use of the 
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Fund. The GAB has been revised and reformed over the 
years. The IMF can also enter into medium term and 
short-term borrowing arrangements to supplement its 
resources. 
2 . 6 Lending Operat ions of the IMF: 
The Fund has a variety of facilities for lending its 
resources to the member countries. The rules governing 
access to the resources of the IMF are uniform for all 
the members. The amount of facility available to a 
member, depends mainly on the quota of the member, 
the strength of members adjustment policies and its BoPs 
needs. However, there also exists special facilities for 
developing countries. Broadly, members of the Fund may 
draw on its resources under the following heads:*^ 
(1) Regular Facilities 
(2) Special Facilities 
(3) Emergency Assistance. 
(1) Regular Fac i l i t i e s : 
These facilities comprise: (1) Tranche facilities and 
(ii) Extended Fund Facility 
Tranche facilities are further divided into (a) gold/ 
reserve Tranche and (b) four credit t ranche. 
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(a) Reserve tranche originally called the gold tranche 
is equal to the difference between the coun t rys 
quota and the Fund's holdings of that coun t rys 
currency. A member country is permitted to draw 
from the IMF at any time without scrutiny to meet 
the requirement of its balance of payment need. 
Reserve tranche purchase is not regarded as the use 
of Fund credit as the country merely uses the 
liquidity it deposited with the Fund as a part of its 
membership subscription. 
(b) In addition to the reserve t ranche, credit is made 
available to members in four t ranches or segments 
each equal to 25 per cent of a m e m b e r s quota. 
The first credit tranche purchase is defined as one 
that raises the Funds holdings of a m e m b e r s 
currency in the Fund to not more than 25 per cent 
of quota. For drawings under first credit tranche 
members must demonstrate reasonable efforts to 
over come BoP problems. In this case no 
performance criteria are insisted upon. Subsequent 
purchases are made in three successive trenches, 
each equal to 25 percent of quota, to a level of 
not more than 100 per cent of quota. Purchases 
in these three trenches are referred to as "upper 
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credit tranche purchases" . Upper credit t ranche 
drawings are made in installments and are released 
on the implementation of the agreed programme in 
full. Policy conditions become more stringent as 
drawings rise under these trenches. 
(ii) Extended Fund Facil i ty (EFF) 
The use of credit in the form of credit t renches was 
criticized mainly by the developing countries for their 
short term duration. The IMF provided loan under 
stringent condition through "stand lay arrangement" for 
a period of 12 months . This period was considered too 
short for any effective monetary and economic plans. 
Hence, a medium term facility called as Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF) was introduced by the IMF in 
September 1974 to give assistance to its members 
having a BoP difficulty caused by structural economic 
changes. 
Under the EFF the Fund may provide assistance to 
its members to overcome their BoP problems over a 
longer period and in amounts larger than their quotas 
than under their credit t ranche policies. If a member ' s 
BoP problem has risen because of structural distort ions 
such as production pat tern has changed or its trading 
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pattern has changed, then the assistance will be 
extended from EFF because it helps in overcoming such 
difficulties on the one hand and at the same time it 
will minimize the loss in output and employment which 
takes a longer time for recovery or improvement. The 
problem does require much longer amount of financing 
than available under the credit t ranche. The EFF thus 
provides finance as well as time to permit them to 
implement policies^. 
(2) Spec ia l Fac i l i t i e s : 
(i) Systematic Transformation Facility (STF): 
This was a temporary facility created in response to 
the needs of the economies in transition from centrally 
planned to market based-system. It's provide financial 
assistance to members experiencing BoPs needs 
resulting from severe disruptions in their traditional trade 
and payments arrangements . It was created in April 
1993 and was in effect though April 1995 . Access to 
the facility was limited to not more than 50% of quota 
and could be in addition to financing obtained under 
other Fund facilities, and the purchase period was the 
same as that for the extended Fund facilities. 
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(ii) Compensatory and Contigcncy financing facilities 
(CCFF) 
The compensatory financing facility started in 1963 
for compensatory financing of developing countries. The 
purpose of this facility is twofold. The compensatory 
element provide resources to members to cover shortfaus 
is export earnings and services receipts and excess in 
cereal import costs that are temporary and arise from 
events beyond the members control. 
(ill) Buffer S tock Financing Faci l i ty: 
The Buffer stock financing facility was established 
in 1969. Under this facility the Fund provides resources 
to help finance member 's contributions to approved 
buffer stocks. Repurchase are made in three and one 
fourth to five years. 
(3) Emergency A s s i s t a n c e 
In addition to the balance of payments support under 
its regular and special facilities, the Fund provides 
emergency assistance in the form of purchases to help 
members meet balance of payments problems arising 
from sudden and unforeseeable natural disorders. These 
include: 
28 
(i) Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) 
The structural adjustment facility was approved by 
the Board of the IMF in March, 1986. This was set up 
to provide concessional assistance to low income 
countries. The plus points are that it has long term 
prospective, related intently with structural problems, 
away from the performance indicators or bench mark 
based on time bound policy actions upon which the 
continuation of disbursements will not automatically 
depend, and the greater collaboration with the world 
Bank^° within this framework, detail yearly policy 
programs are formulated and are supported by SAF or 
ESAF, arrangements . ESAF arrangement is differ from 
SAF arrangements in the scope and strength of 
structural policies, and in terms of access levels 
monitoring procedure, and source of funding. The rate 
of interest on SAF and ESAF loans is 0.5 per cent, 
and repayments are made in five and one half io ten 
years. 
The lending operations of the IMF technically take 
the form of sale of currency. Any member nation 
running short of foreign currency may buy the required 
currency from the Fund in exchange of its own currency. 
But the buying member is under an obligation to 
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repurchase its currency from the Fund within the 
stipulated time period. 
Similarly the availability of Fund from the IMF is 
subject to policy conditions. These conditions become 
more stringent with the rising level of borrowing and 
relate to: 
(a) The appropr ia teness of the exchange rate, 
(b) The e l iminat ion or reduction of exchange 
restrictions of complexities, 
(c) effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies in 
containing or reducing inflation. 
(d) r e s t r i c t ion on govt . deficits by r e d u c i n g 
expenditures especially subsidies, 
(e) Financial liberalisation, 
(f) encouragement of the private sector etc. 
These po l i cy c o n d i t i o n s a re k n o w n as 
"conditionality" and are the control element in Fund 
policy on use of its resources. But it has also led to 
the severe criticism of the IMF on the ground that it 
limits the independence of the country concerned not 
only in managing the balance of payments, but also in 
the area of trade and industrial policies. Accepting IMF 
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conditions loan may be available but the problem of 
poverty and unemployment may not be solved the 
country may go deeper into the moras of dependence 
on external support^^ 
2 . 7 Evolut ion of The IMF: 
As discussed in the preceding section the IMF came 
into existence as an organisation of countries seeking 
promotion of international monetary cooperation and 
expansion of trade with a view to contribute to 
increased employment and improvement in economic 
conditions among all member countries. It has worked 
consistently towards the at tainment of this goal and 
evolved in several important direction in response to 
changing conditions. In this section we discuss some 
of the important changes that have taken place in the 
Bretton woods systems since its inception 
(a) Creat ion of Spec ia l Drawing Rights (SDRs) 
The special drawing rights (SDRs). also known as 
paper gold was created by the IMF in 1969 as 
international reserves assets to meet the long term 
global needs to supplement existing international 
reserves. They were created through the first amendment 
to the Fund as unconditional reserves assets to influence 
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the level of world reserves in order to solve the problem 
of international liquidity. They were allocated to the 
participant member in proportion to the Fund's quota. 
For this purpose the Fund has established the special 
drawing accounts. 
The feature, the creation and use of SDRs as they 
stood originally, were as under.^^ 
(i) A unit of SDRs was declared to be equivalent to 
0 .888671 gram of fine gold which was equivalent 
to the value of one US dollar. 
(ii) Participation in the SDR managements is open only 
to the members of the IMF. However membership 
in the SDR system is not obligatory. 
(iii) SDRs can only be held by official agencies say 
central bank. The SDRs are not issued in the form 
of certificates. The initial allocations and the 
transactions are recorded in the books of the IMF. 
(iv) While SDRs are an asset to the holders, they do 
not represent the liability of the IMF or any other 
agency. There is no "backing" for SDRs. in the 
form of assets, except the undertaking of member 
countries to abide by the regulations concerning the 
SDRs. 
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(v) The heart of the SDRs system is unconditional right 
of a holder to receive from other holders designated 
by the Fund, convertible currencies in exchange for 
SDRs. This right is matched by an even larger 
obligation on the part of member countries, namely, 
to accept SDRs. upto a maximum of 200 per cent 
of the allocation. 
(vi) Although a member can use up all the SDRs 
allocated to it. it is required to maintain an average 
holding of 30 per cent of the initial allocation 
during a five year period. This is to restrain 
member countries from rushing into using up SDRs 
without drawing upon other reserves . This 
restriction was removed in 1 9 8 1 . 
(vii) The issue of the SDR to member countries strictly 
in proportion to their quotas in the IMF. 
(viii) Those who make use of SDRs to acquire other 
currencies (debtors) have to pay interest rates and 
those who receive SDRs from other (creditors) 
would receive the same rate of interest, originally 
both being 1.5% per annum 
(ix) There is a complex procedure for the issue of 
SDRs. so that it represents a near unanimous 
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decision of the participating members. A proposal 
for issuing SDRs requires 85% majority of votes of 
the Board of Governors. 
(x) In order to provide some long range planning the 
managing director is expected to propose the 
allocation SDRs for a basic period of five years 
generally, the aggregate amount being issued in 
installments. But this period like some other 
features, including the rate of interest, can be 
varied. So far as the first allocation was concerned, 
the basic period was conceived in terms of three 
years. 
In order to further widen the use of SDRs the second 
Amendment (1973) empowered the Fund to lay down 
uses of SDRs in transaction with the other participants. 
These 'prescribed holders" of SDRs have the same 
degree of freedom as Fund members to buy and sell 
SDRs and receive or use them in loans, pleadges, swaps, 
donations or settlement of financial obligations. In 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 there were 15 'prescribed holder's^^-. 
1. African Development Bank. 
2. African Development Fund. 
3. The Andean Reserve Fund. 
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4. The Arb Monetary Fund, Abu Dhabi. 
5. The Asian Development Bank, Manila. 
6. BlS-Basle. 
7. The Bank of Central African States. Yaondi. 
8. The Central Bank of Western African Countries. Dakar. 
9. The East African Bank, Kampala. 
10. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, Basse Terre. 
1 1 . The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Washington 
12. International Development Agency (IDA). Washington 
13 . The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank for A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Development 
14. Islamic Development Bank. Jeddah. 
15. The Nordic dev. Bank. Helsinki. 
16. The Swiss National Bank, Zurich. 
The Fund has also adopted a series of decisions 
allowing the following additional use of SDRs^^ 
(i) in Swap arrangements 
(ii) in forward operat ions. 
(iii) in loans to other member 
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(iv) in set t lement of financial obligations 
(v) As security for performance for financial obligations 
(vi) in donat ion. 
The third major change came in the reconstitution 
clause of the SDRs. Reconstitution provision was the 
feature of the SDRs as safeguard to its conversion into 
another assets from the time of its inception. The 
participant was required to maintain a minimum average 
holdings of SDRs of 30% of its net cumulative allocation 
over successive 5 years. By late 1970s when the Fund 
realized that the usability of SDR has increased under 
basket technique of valuation the SDR is valued as the 
sum of fixed amount of several currencies. To ensure 
maximum stability for the exchange value of SDR, the 
criterion for the selection of a currency was that it 
should be most widely used in international trade and 
payments. The weight given to a currency indicated 
importance of the currency in trade as well as in 
financial markets . To reflect the changing importance 
of different currencies in world trade periodic reviews 
and changes in the composition of basket was ncessary 
After the introduction of 5 currency basket the weights 
were changed in 1986 and then in 1 9 9 1 . The matter 
36 
of increasing the SDRs by another 36 billion in a near 
future in under consideration of the Board Governors of 
the Fund (June, 1995).^' 
(b) The Role of Cold 
The use and place of gold in the international 
monetary system were most drastic feature of the 2nd 
amendment . The broader objective of the second 
amendment was to reduce the role of gold in the 
international monetary system. This objective was 
pursued by immediate and radical changes in the role 
of the gold, prohibition of any function as a denominator 
of exchange rate arrangements and the elimination of 
the obligation of the Fund as well as members to transfer 
or receive gold under articles of the Fund and a 
disposition of a part of gold held by the Fund were 
radical innovations. As far as the member is concerned 
they were left free to buy gold on a particular price. 
(c) The Exchange rate Arrangements 
The most important aspect of the second amendment 
regarding exchange rate is that it legalized to choose 
exchange rate arrangements by member countries 
including floating. Only a few country did that. The 
amendment completely departed from the articles of the 
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the Agreement of the Fund (1944). The par value system 
was abolished, the new objective regarding exchange rate 
was "a stable system of exchange rates". The emphasis 
in these provisions shifted stable exchange rate to 
orderly economic and financial conditions that will 
promote a stable system of exchange rates. In order to 
achieve the stability in the system member became 
subject to certain obligations in relation to their external 
and domestic policies and the IMF was required to 
maintain a surveilance. 
(d) Freely Usable Currency 
Before the second amendment there were some 
currencies (US $ & £ sterling) which were used for 
purchase and repurchase of other currencies by member. 
The 2nd Amendment provided that Fund shall have 
policies of its own to select currencies for use. The 
following currencies were declared as usable: French 
Franc, German Duetch Mark, Japanese Yen. US Dollar 
& Sterling. 
2 . 8 Concluding Remarks : 
Concluding we may say that the IMF come into 
existence as a balance of payments institution and 
provided resources for relatively short-run. With the 
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passage of time the Fund has given greater emphasis on 
longer term balance of payments problems. Its focus 
of attention since the 1950 has been the developing 
countries in general and the least developed member 
countries in particular. It has introduced special 
concessional lending facilities to assist low income 
members developing countries with protected balance of 
payment problems. The IMF has also responded to the 
needs of a market dominated world economy. 
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O H A . I > T r E R - I I I 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INDIA 
3 . 1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to focus on India's relations with 
the International Monetary Fund. India is a founder member 
of the IMF and has played an important role in the 
formulation of its policies. Similarly. India has taken 
recourse to financial assistance from the IMF on various 
occasions to meet out her balance of payments difficulties. 
Accordingly India's relations with the IMF is analysed under 
two heads, namely India's role in decision making in the 
IMF (section 3.2) and the financial transaction between the 
IMF and India (Section 3.3). The main conclusions of the 
chapter are presented in the final section (3.4) 
3 . 2 India's role in the IMF 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the IMF was 
established in 1944 following the painful experience of the 
thirties. Its broad objectives included, regulation of the 
volume of the International liquidity, ensuring the stability 
of exchange rate, promotion of free trade and capital 
movement, coordination of economic policy of the member 
countries and assisting them in resolving their BoPs 
difficulties. It was also stated that the creation of IMF. was 
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inreality, a substitute for the gold standard and an 
alternative to the system of free exchange 
Hence it was considered necessary for India to acquire 
the membership of the Fund and share the international 
prosperity by increasing her tempo of industrializanion and. 
at the same time, to contribute towards the achievements 
of broader economic ends. Because, there was urgent need 
for the rehabilitation of the Indian economy, its expansion 
and modernisatin. The maintenance of high level of 
employment and real incomes within the country needed 
the best of our attention and vigilance. 
Moreover, the membership of the Fund was expected 
to bring the following potential benefits to India.^ 
(i) To delink rupees with the sterling as a consequence 
of the linking of the World currencies with gold The 
rupee, was also to be linked to the currencies of the 
world. 
(ii) Possibility of obtaining short-term loan from the Fund 
for correcting temporary disequilibrium in her current 
payment positions. 
(iii) Facility to devalue the rupee in case of permanent 
disequilibrium without retaliation from other member 
countries. 
(iv) Participation in the future formulation of \nXeTnai\ona\ 
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Monetary policies. 
(v) Facility of obtaining expert opinion on various 
monetary problems as the International Monetary Fund 
was to be the body of experts 
(vi) Possibility of multilateralism in trade, which the Fund 
sought to establish, and which was of great advantage 
to India for it could enable her to utilize her foreign 
exchange earnings at competitive prices, and lastly 
(vii) Cooperation and active collaboration in monetary 
matters with other member countries 
Against these considerations alongwith 44 other 
representative countries India joined the Fund at the time 
of its establishment and since then has played an important 
role in the decision making process in the Fund On a 
number of crucial points, which have a bearing on the 
developing countries, India has supported view pomts 
protecting their interest Most of India's view points have 
found expression through India's work with the group of 
24 (the international group on Monetary Affair) and her 
stated position in the interim committee and in the annual 
meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the world 
bank group In this context, the following areas, could be 
particularly identified in which India's contribution may be 
considered as important: 
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a. Quota Calculations 
The quotas being the capital base of the Fund assume 
significance as they decide a country's: 
Financial and organisational relations with the Fund; 
i. Voting power in the Fund's decision making; 
ii. Access to the Funds financial facilities; and 
V, Share in SDR allocation. 
Accordingly the quota issues have been most difficult 
to resolve. When initial quotas for the founder members 
were fixed a number of countries including India had 
objected to the proposals for quotas and votes. An adhoc 
committee for the determination of quotas of the individual 
member was formed and India was a member of the said 
committee. The committee placed India's quota at US$ 
400million in July 1944. This formed 5 percent of total 
Fund Quota's. 
b. SDR Allocation 
Another important issue on which India has made its 
views felt is the allocation of SDRs. SDRs were last 
allocated in 1980-81 which was 681.17 million. Although 
initially it was intended that. SDRs be created as and when 
global needs for liquidity arises, no SDRS were allocated 
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subsequent to 1980-81, as there was no consensus among 
member of the Fund on the presence of a global 
needs.India and other developing countries which have 
been pressing for a general allocation of SDRs have 
indicated their willingness to go along with one time special 
allocation of SDRs on grounds of equity. 
c. Access Limits 
The member of the IMF can make use of Fund resources 
up to the access limits which are fixed from time to time 
for various facilities of the IMF. The Funds credit tranche 
Policies limit the use of ordinary resources to 100 per cent 
of quota. However, it does not imply a prohibition of 
purchases beyond 100 per cent. Historically, maximum 
access to the various Funds policies and facilities has varied 
in keeping with the flexibility of the policies on use of 
Fund resources. In 1981, the IMF approved enlarge access 
policy with the broad objective of providing stand by or 
extended arrangement assistance to members which are 
facing balance of payments problem that are large 
compared to their quotas. 
3 . 3 Financial Transaction between India and IMF: 
Broadly. India's Financial transaction with the Fund 
could be divided into three categories: 
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a) Those relating to quota subscription 
b) SDR allocations 
c) Borrowing from the IMF 
In this section, we analyse Indias subscription quota 
in the Fund as well as the allocation of SDRs while the 
country's borrowing from the Fund will be discussed in detail 
in the flowing chapter. 
a. Quota Subscription: 
As mentioned in the preceding section, India's initial 
quota in the Fund was fixed at $400 million which formed 
5 per cent of the total Fund Quota. What is perhaps of 
more important is the fact that India also enjoyed fifth 
place in the Fund on the basis of her quota. 
As per the original agreement reached at Bretton 
woods, member countries having the largest number of 
share in the Fund's capital were the US. the UK. the 
former USSR. Chaina. France and India in that order As 
the USSR failed to ratify the agreement. India moved on 
to the fifth place which assumes significance as each of 
the five members having the largest shares were entitle to 
have a 'Permanent' Chair in the Executive Board and to 
appoint its own executive directions. India thus enjoyed a 
permanent seat in the IMF at the time of its inception. 
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Till 1970 India's quota in the Fund was the fifth and it 
had the power to appoint a permanent Executive Director. With 
the increase in the Fund quota after May 1970, the quota of 
Japan. Canada and Italy increased more than that of India. 
Accordingly. India ceased to hold a permanent position as 
Executive Director of the Fund. 
Table 3.1 gives a comparative picture of the total 
increase in the Fund's q u o t a s under successive 
Quinnquennial and general reviews with the relative figures 
for India. 
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Table 3 . 1 Distribution of IMF Quota to India in 
General Review 
Review of 
Quotas 
First quinquennial 
Second 
1958/59 „ „ 
Third 
Fourth ,, ,, 
Fifth General 
Sixth General 
Seventh General 
Eight 
Ninth 
Tenth 
IMF's Total 
Quotas 
(SDRtnillion) 
8036.50 
8750.50 
14640.25 
20932.00 
28776.00 
38976.40 
59605.50 
89236.30 
141404,30 
144737.80' 
Indias Quota 
(SDRmillion) 
400.00 
400.00 
600.00 
750.00 
940.00 
1145.00 
1717.50 
2207.70 
3055.50 
3055.50 
India's Share 
in total quotas 
(%) 
4.98 
4.57 
4.10 
-
3.58 
3.27 
2.87 
2.47 
2.16 
2.11 
India's 
Rank 
5 
5 
5 
-
5 
8 
8 
11 
13 
13 
Source:RBl Occasional Paper Vol. 18, No. 2 & 3 (June & Sept, 1997). 
*: Fund quotas at Present. 
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It can be seen from the table 3.1 that Indias place 
in the Fund has been going down in relative terms. In March 
1983. India's quota in the Fund after the eighth revision 
stood at 2207.70 million SDR. i.e. 2.47 per cent of the 
total Fund quota and India has relegatedto the eleventh 
position. Once the ninth and Tenth revision is formalised, 
India will come down to 13th position with 2.11 per cent 
quota of 3055 .5 million SDR 
Thus, India has been steadily going down in the IMF 
dispensation since its early years. There was a time when 
India was one of the top five nations which meant that it 
was assured of in executive directorship without having to 
stand for election. As India slipped further, it reached 12th 
and now 13th in the tutem pole, the Indian Executive 
director is now elected with the votes of Srilanka and 
Bangladesh in addition to its own.-
India's falling share in total quotas reflect Indias falling 
share in world trade, relatively low growth of GDP and 
low level of foreign reserves over certain periods. It may, 
however, be noted that a decline in Indias share in 
calculated quota does not necessarily reflect depressed 
economic performance by India in absolute terms as 
changing share in quotas reflect relative performance of 
economic including industrial economies.-^ 
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b. Allocation of SDRs 
SDR was created by the IMF in 1969 as an 
International reserves asset to meet the long term global 
need to supplement existing International reserves. The 
creation of SDR reflected the international community's 
dissatisfaction with the monetary system in which the main 
source of liquidity expansion was the balance of payments 
of the US SDRs are allocated to members participating in 
the SDR department. A total of SDR 21.4 billion was 
allocated during the first basic period (1970-72) and a part 
of the third basic period (1979-81). The allocation of SDRs 
to India and the holdings of SDRs at different periods of 
time are given in Table 3.2. 
57 
Tabic 3 . 2 Allocations of SDRs to India (SDRs million) 
Tear Allocation Cumulative Amount Percent of 
allocation allocation 
1970 126 00 126 00 126 00 100 00 
1971 158 58 226 58 179 76 79 34 
1972 99 64 326 22 247 69 76 00 
1979 119 08 445 30 344 89 77 45 
1980 119 08 564 38 490 05 86 83 
1981 116 79 68117 493 46 72 44 
1985 681 17 221 17 32 00 
1990 681 17 82 47 12 00 
1991 68117 134 51 20 00 
91 68 13 00 
68 88 10 00 
127 18 19 00 
50 41 7 00 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
681 17 
681 17 
681 17 
681 17 
Source. International Financial Statistics, IMF RBI 
occasional paper, vol 18. Nos 2&3, Special 
issue (June & Sept). 1997 p 498 
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As it is clear from the table, the the total cumulative 
SDRs allocation to India in 1970 was to SDRs 126.00 
million. This cumulative allocation of SDR to India is now 
amounts to SDR 681.17 million in 1995. 
3 .4 Concluding Remarks 
Summarizing, the birth of the International Monetary 
Fund was a land mark in the International monetary co-
operation. India has used this organization to influence its 
macro economy as well as individual sectors. It has also 
worked for safeguarding the interest of other developing 
countries by influencing the decision making process in the 
Fund. 
References: 
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INIDA'S BORROWING FROM IMF: 
4 . 1 Introduct ion 
In this chapter an attempt is made to critically 
review India's borrowing experience with the IMF ever 
since its inception. The chapter is divided into five 
sections. Section 4.2 gives a brief historical overview 
of India's balance of payments position under plans and 
focuses on how the F u n d s resources have been used 
to overcome the pressure on external front. Section 4.3 
deals with the IMF conditionality and also examines 
its implications for the Indian economy in general. This 
is followed by a critical evaluation of India's borrowing 
from the Fund in section 4 .4 . Finally, section. 4.5 
summerises the main conclusions of this chapter. 
4 . 2 Role of IMF's Financial A s s i s t a n c e in 
Financing India's BoP def i c i t . 
The balance of payment is one of the oldest and 
most important statistical statement for any country, 
especially the more open one. It is "a systematic 
record of all economic transactions between the 
residents of given country and of the residents of the 
rest of the world in an accounting period viz. a year."^ 
The balance of payments statement is devided into two 
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major accounts viz, current account and capital account 
Transaction relating to goods services and income 
constitute the current account, while those relating to 
claims and liabilities of a financial nature, which go 
to finance the deficit on current account or to absorb 
its surplus, form the capital account. The sum of these 
current and capital account transactions together 
constitutes the basic balance on the balance of 
payment. 
Since balance of payments accounts are prepared 
on the double -entry systems of accounting, sum of all 
debits equals the sum of all credits and the account 
are always in balance. However, the deficit or surplus 
is measured by summarizing all items in the balance 
of payment except those in the nation's official reserve 
account. When the debits (payments) exceed the credit 
(receipts) in the current and capital accounts, BoP said 
to be in "deficit'. In the opposite case we have a 
surplus" in the BoPs. A 'deficit' in the BoP is 
considered, as negative or unfavourable or adverse BoP 
situation for the reporting country; and a 'surplus' in 
the balance of payments is considered as positive, 
favourable or active BoP situation of the country. 
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Thus, balance of payment is an important index 
which reflects the true economic position of a country, 
whether the country is a creditor or debtor county and 
whether its currency is rising or falling in its external 
value. Actually, the diseqilibrium in the balance of 
payments is undesirable and bad for the country 
concerned and it is the ultimate responsibility of the 
govt, to maintain the balance of payments equilibrium 
The govt and the Central Bank must have adequate 
reserves or appropriate borrowing arrangements to 
bridge the gap in BoPs Problems^. 
When India became independent, it had a 'sterling 
balance" worth Rs. 1. 733 crores. This was the result 
of a sizeable surplus on balance of trade with the U K 
acquired during the second world war period when U K 
had made large scale purchasing from India to meet, 
its war requirements^ During the First Plan the 
balance of payment position remained satisfactory The 
net deficit on current account was only of the order 
of Rs. 151 crores as against Rs. 667-727 crores 
expected in the plan. There ws a net cash outflow of 
Rs. 22 crores of private capital and net inflows of Rs 
36 crores of official capital. The total depletion in 
reserves was of the order of Rs. 127 crores. The 
overall deficit in BoP was negligible at Rs. 42 crore''. 
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This was because the First plan put emphasis on 
agriculture and did not require large imports of 
machinery and capital goods. 
India did not avail of any facility from the IMF; 
instead India repurchased (repaid) the amount borrowed 
earlier. India withdraw SDR 28 million in 1947-48 and 
SDR 71 .98 million in 1948-49. 
The development strategy adopted in the S e c o n d 
Plan gave primary importance to the establishment and 
development of basic and capital goods industries. This 
necessitated large scale imports of capital equipments, 
machinery and technical know-how. Throughtout, the 
second plan period, export remained stagnent while 
the value of imports almost doubled the value of 
exports . As a result the deficit in the balance of 
payments during the second plan increased to R s . l 6 4 4 
crore^. 
This resulted in the significance loss of reserves. 
Infact, by the middle of the second plan, the balance 
of payment problem became so acute that to cope with 
the situation, India pursued restrictive import policy and 
borrowed an amount equivalent to SDR 200 m from the 
IMF. 
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The balance of payment position remained tight 
during the Third Plan and the deficit rose further 
to Rs. 1,972 crore. The main reasons were rise in the 
import of industrial raw materials, machinery, mainte-
nance and defence equipment due to the Chinese 
aggression of 1962 and Indo-Pak war of 1965 and fall 
in the export of traditional items like cotton textile and 
jute goods. 
As a result India borrowed a relatively large amount 
of SDR 375 million from the IMF during the third plan 
period. 
The period of Three Annual plans following the 
third plan also witnessed a substantial deficit of more 
than Rs. 2000 crore. 
India, besides devalueing her currency, sought the 
assistance from the IMF to the tune of SDR 415 million 
including SDR 90 million under the compensatory 
financing facilities (CFF) to tide over the deficit. 
During the Fourth Plan period.some natural 
disturbances occurred. The monsoon rain did not 
arrive as expected in the Indian subcontinent in 1972 . 
A severe drought hit large part of Africa and Asia. 
These developments resulted in heavy price increases 
and an inflationary impetus was given to the world 
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economy. The prices of the basics increased by 100 
per cent and the fertilizer prices increased by 170 per 
cent.^ 
The most spectacular and the most mportant 
disturbance was however, manmade. Following the 
Arab-Israeli war which started in Oct 1 9 7 3 . the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
decided to increase the price of the oil drastically The 
oil price was increased by almost 300 per cent. Many 
countries, including India ran very heavy deficit in their 
BoPs in 1974. The deficit inlndias balance of trade 
came to be Rs 1563 9 crores 
To finance the deficit between 1973-74 and 1974-
75 India borrowed from the IMF a sum of SDR 775 
million including SDR 200 million under the oil facility 
The pressure on BoP continued in the early years 
of 1975-76. India therefore drew from the Fund in 
Aug.1975 an amount SDR 201.34 million, under the 
oil facilities." 
During the Fifth Plan (except the first year 1974-
75) the over all balance of payments position turned 
out to be very satisfactory. This relatively short period 
(76-79 and 79-80) was a golden period as far as the 
balance of payments is concerned. India had a small 
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current account surpluses of 0.6 per cent of GDP during 
this period and also poses foreign exchange reserves 
equivalent to about seven months inriport.^ The 
relatively comfortable position on the balance of 
payments front ws due to the following factors.: 
i) First and foremost was the rapid increase in 
private remittance from oil exporting countries A 
large number of Indian workers temporarily 
migrated to the oil-rich middle east contries and 
started remitting their net ernings to their families 
in India. 
2) There was a strong growth in exports of nearly 
3 1 % in 1975-76 over 1974-75 and 2 3 % in 1976-
77 over 1975-76 (in rupee terms). 
3) As a result of the conservation measures adopted 
domestically and increase in oil production, the 
country ws able to arrest the growth in oil import 
Only after 1977-78 when the country attained a 
comfortable position in its balance of payments 
and foreign exchange reserves did the import of 
crude oil Pick up. 
4) There was a substential expansioin in the 
activities of Indian firms in the oil exporting 
middle east countries. Indian firms were 
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building roads, airport , housing, estates, 
power station, steel mills etc. in a number of 
middle east countries. These export of con-
struction services as well as of some meterials 
countributed substantially to India's foreign 
exchange earnings. 
As a resit of these factors, the Indian economy 
adjusted to the first oil shock rather quickly, In fact, 
during two years of fifth plan- 1976-77 and 1977-78 
there was a surplus on current account. Taking the 
fifth plan as a whole, there was a deficit of only Rs. 
1,146 crore on current account. Table 4 .1 gives an 
account of India's transactions with the IMF during the 
period 1945-46 to 1979-80. 
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The IMF set up a Trust Fund in 1976 mainly from the 
resources that came from profit of selling a portion of its 
gold holding at market prices. The Trust Fund resources 
were used for providing balance of payment assistance to 
eligible low income developing member countries of the 
Fund on highly concessional terms, over two prescribed 
periods. The Fund laid down conditions that governed the 
receipt of a assistance from the trust Fund and broadly 
referred to the ability of country to demonstrate the need 
for balance of payments assistance and also that it was 
making a reasonable effort to strengthen its ballance of 
payments position. Sixty one developing member countries 
were listed in the first basic period as eligible for Trust 
Fund assistance and India was among them. In fact India's 
entitlement on total quotas of eligible membes was the 
highest at 25 per cent. However, due to the inherent 
strength in external payments and reserves position. India 
was unable to demonstrate the need for using the Trust Fund 
loan and consequently could not draw on her entitlement 
which was then redistributed to others in needs. 
In the second period (Ju ly l978 through 1980) 
however India made use of Trust Fund loans amounting 
to SDR 529 .01 million. And the total amount was 
repaid by the year 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 . This can be seen from 
the data presented inTable 4 .2 . 
66 
Table - 4 . 2 
India's Transact ion with IMF (Trust Fund 
Year 
(Apr-Mar) 
Loan) 
Trust Fund (SDR million) 
Loans Repayments 
1980-81 529 .01 — 
1981-82 — — 
1982-83 — — 
1983-84 — — 
1984-85 — — 
1985-86 — 52 .55 
1986-87 — 105.09 
1987-88 — 105.09 
1988-89 — 105.09 
1989-90 — 105.09 
1990-91 — 56.10 
Source: Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers vol 18 
No. 2 & 3 special issue (June &Sept.) 1997 
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The second oil shock came in 1979-80 as the oil 
prices were hiked by the OPEC. This had a serious 
negative impact on the Indian economy and the 
government of India in order to finance huge current 
account deficit in the early eighties, entered into a 
three year extended Arrangement with the IMF for SDR 
5.0 billion in November 1 9 8 1 . This was the largest 
amount that any member country had borrowed under 
any facility from the Fund till then. Of the total loan 
SDR900 million were to be made available in the first 
year, SDR 1.8 billion in the second year and SDR 2.3 
billion in the third year. In terms of relative share the 
year wise distribution was 18 percent 36 per cent 
and 46 per cent respectively. 
The First part SDR 600 million was drawn at the 
end of 1982, In the second year of agreement India 
brought SDR 1800 million at the end of 1 9 8 3 . A 
further SDR 1300 million was drawn in 1 9 8 3 - 8 4 . Thus 
in all India could draw SDR 3.9 b within the three 
years of agreement . In January 1984, nearly 10 month 
ahead of the end of the arrangement period India on 
its own informed the Fund that the last t ranche of SDR 
1.1 billion was not needed. 
68 
The balance of payment performance during the 
Six th Plan turned out to be much better than initially 
anticipated. The current account deficit was Rs. 6 ,400 
crore as aginst estimated amount of Rs. 9 ,100 crore. 
The ipmrovement in the balance of payment was the 
result of several factors. First, there was a considerable 
saving in the imports of crude oil as a result of increase 
in its domestic production. The domestic production of 
crude oil increased from 11 .8 million tonnes in 1979-
80 to 29 million tonnes in 1984-85 . Second, the 
growth in import was checked considerably by signifi-
cant improvement in the functioning of infrastructure, 
import substitution in steel, cement, non-ferous metals 
and improvement in food grain production. Third, there 
were net SDR 3.9b drawals from the IMF and other 
borowings to fill the balance of payments gap. Lastly, 
there were large capital inflows from non-resident 
Indians helping the country in improvement in the 
balance of payments position during the sixth plan. 
The happy situation on the balance of payment 
front however, did not continue during the S e v e n t h 
Plan. Trade deficit in the first three years of the plan 
exceeded Rs 9000 crore per annum and in the fourth 
and fifth years (1988-89) and (1989-90) exceeded Rs. 
69 
12000 crore per year ^^ Following the adoption of the 
liberalisation policy by the govt, imports increased 
considerably while exports largely lagged behind 
India did not take any recourse to the IMF 
borrowing till December 1990 During 1988-89 and 
1989-90 the Indian economy became heavily dependent 
on short term commercial borrowing from abroad This 
was due to the increasing fiscal deficit of the govt 
of India and laso due to the programme of import 
liberalization. 
The Gulf crisis during the year 1990-91 created a 
critical BoP situation in India In addition to the 
massive trade deficit of Rs 16. 934 crore. there v*.as 
a deterioration in the invisible account as well because 
of lower remittance and higher interest payments The 
current account deficit soared to Rs 17. 369 crore 
The govt had to impose a strict import squeeze As 
a result, the value of imports declined by 19 4 per cent 
in 1991-92 in doller terms as compared with 1990-91 
while exports were almost stagnant. The foreign 
exchange reserve was equal to three and a half months 
import Around the same time credit rating of the 
country was lowered restricting the country's access to 
cmmercial borwoings Foreign exchange reserves kept 
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on falling and on the expectat ions of impending 
depreciation of the rupee, there was a temporary loss 
of confidence leading to a flight of NRI deposits. The 
import cover of foreign exchange declined to just one 
month of imports at the end of 1990-91 and dipped 
further to less than half a month by July 1 9 9 1 . 
In such an adverse situation India had to look for 
a deal with IMF/ world Bank for improving the 
situation. It was in January 1 9 9 1 . that the govt, of 
India received first credit tranche of SDR 552 million 
and CCFF loan during January September 1991 of SDR 
1352 million. It also borrowed under stand by credit 
to the tune of SDR 270 million between Nov. 1991 to 
January 1992 . The gross drawing from the Fund during 
this period amounted to SDR 2.2 billion. Table 4 .3 
gives the details of India's recourse to IMFs Funds 
during the eighties and the nineties. It shows that to 
overcome the BoP difficulties India borrowed from the 
IMF SDR 231 .00 million in 1993. -94 under the stand-
by arrangement. Thereafter, it has not taken any 
financial assistance from the Fund. 
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4 . 3 IMF Condit ional i ty and i ts Impl icat ions . 
The IMF does not provide financial assistance to 
its member countries without any conditions. In fact as 
discussed in chapter 2. the availability of financial 
assistance from the Fund is subject to policy conditions 
which become more stringent as drawings rise through 
different tranche. These policy conditions are known 
as "conditionality" and in general term refers to the 
terms and conditions of loans. The conditions can be 
broadly divided into two categories as the conditions 
on the utilisation of the loan viz.. utilisation and 
promptness in the execution of projects and the 
conditions for the change in the macro-economic 
policies of the Government. , i.e., the introduction of 
supply management measures and structural reforms. 
The later broadly include: 
i. The integration of the economy into the world 
economy. 
ii. Curbing the role played by the govt, in the 
economy. 
iii. Allowing the market forces to play a greater role. 
Thus the IMF Policy package is a programme for 
opening up of the economy to the entry of foreign 
goods and foreign capital. This is required to be 
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achieved through the reduction of tariffs on entry 
foreign goods and services and by the elimination of 
any quantitative restriction on them. Integration of the 
economy into the world economy is assumed to follow 
since capital and goods can freely come in. This means 
the removal of controls, delicensing, provision of a 
hospitable climate for multinational goods via import 
liberalisation and for multinational capital. But such 
conditions imposed by the IMF while granting loans to 
borrowing countries have been generally criticised by 
the politicians and academicians of developing 
countries on various grounds: Firstly, they are means 
for strengthening the monopoly sector, accelerating 
concentrat ion of output and capital . destroying 
indigenous skills and technology, and increasing 
dependence on technology imports and foreign capital 
Secondly, the IMF package is not only inequitious; it 
is ineffective as well in curbing the balance for payments 
deficits. Payments deficit in developing countries is not a 
temporary phenomenon or accidental phenomenon, but one 
which recurs in every period as they can not earn as much 
foreign exchange as are needed. Their export volume does 
not increase both on account of element and supply factors 
while significantly has an everincreasing tendency to meet 
75 
the development requirements. The terms of trade have also 
moved against the developing countries. 
Thirdly, a devaluation of the currency to shift the 
international terms of trade in favour of the advanced 
capitalist countries is a part of the package. This is done 
even when it is not justified by the relative rates of inflation 
in the country and the world economy. Devaluation of the 
domestic currency makes imports expensive raises the cost 
of servicing the foreign debt and in inflationary in character. 
Thus the net effect of devaluation is generally higher 
inflation, worsening of fiscal problems, greater recessions, 
or a combination of these. 
Fourthly, the most important implications of the 
IMF loan involve the repayment of the principle amount 
of the loan and the payment of interest. For example, 
during 1981-84 India borrowed the gross amount of Rs. 
5200 cr, but the net inflow in to India over these years 
was Rs. 4810 .92 c only. The total interest payment 
obligation was Rs. 4 0 6 1 . 5 8 crores and the total debt 
servicing was to the extent of Rs. 9261 .58 crore which 
worked out nearly to 78% of the original contracted 
amount. 
The implication of the India's borrowing from the 
IMF in 1981 is shown in Table 4 .4 . 
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Again during the year 1990-91 the balance of 
payments problem became grave, thereby necessitating 
the Indian Govt, to obtain a loan from IMF to augment 
foreign exchange reserves posit ion.India 's borrowing 
from IMF and its debts implication can be seen with 
the help of Table 4 .5 . 
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It is clear from the table that against the IMF Loan 
of Rs. 3 3 9 9 crore the total interest payment amounted 
to Rs. 1 1 1 6 . 1 3 crore while total debt servicing worked 
out to be Rs. 4 4 1 6 . 3 crore. 
Fifthly, the IMF policy package is a programme 
for several curtailments in the living standards of the 
working people . It forces the govt, of the borrowing 
country to cut back on expenditures in the social sector 
like health, and education or in employment generation 
in the name of achieving fiscal balance. Many of these 
areas become available for the private sector. Import 
liberlization means the eliminating the domestic 
producers in a number of industries and consequently 
unemployment. Tight monetary policy has the similar 
effect. 
The logic of the IMF package therefore is such that 
its net result must be an "inflation" and "recession" 
and unemployment, a squeeze on money wages and 
salaries and cut in public expenditure on welfare relief 
and subsidies on essential consumption i tems. Each of 
these measures adversely affects the low and middle 
income groups; together their impact can be 
disastrous. And if a devaluation is additionally thrown 
in. the impact is even greater via its inflationary 
consequences. 
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Last but not the least the IMF is criticised on 
the ground that it is guide by U.S.A and other 
developed countries while disbursing loans. And these 
countries try to impose their philosophy on member 
countries. 
The Fund has been conservative from the very 
beginning. It has laid down stringent conditions for 
lending to member countries. It charges high interest 
rate. For instance, if a loan is financed from the 
ordinary resources of the Fund, the interest rate charge 
is 6.5 percent. On the other hand, if the loan is 
financed from the borrowed resources by the Fund, the 
interest rate as high as 15 per cent. During 1950s 
and 1960s, a member country was required to repay 
the loan within 3 to 5 years. Now the repayment period 
of loans under the EFF is between four and ten years 
from the Funds own resources and 3.5 to 7 years for 
borrowed Funds. 
4.4 Critical Evaluation of India's Borrowing from IMF: 
In India too the borrowing from the IMF has not 
been welcomed by all sections of the society. For 
example, when India borrowed from the IMF in 1 9 8 1 . 
it was bitterly criticised among others, by the 
government of West Bengal which had arranged a 
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conference under the economist finance minister Dr. 
Ashok Mitra on this issue. Twenty three economists, 
specially invited by the W.B. govt., drew attention to 
the economic danger of the loan and, in particular, 
according to them, to the loss of economic sovereignty 
implied in the conditions. The W. Bengal govt, came 
out with a white paper on the IMF loan titled, "IMF 
loan-Facts and Issue", Some of the important criticisms 
made by these economist may be summerisc as 
follows.^^ 
i. The nations prerogative to formulate its economic 
policies and preservations to cure its economic 
problems is going to be seriously circumscribed by 
the acceptance of the conditions laid down by the 
Fund. India's monetary and fiscal policies during 
the period of loan would be formulated not in New 
Delhi, but in Washington. 
ii. The conditions of the loan whittle down seriously 
the broad tenor of economic policy in India sofar 
accepted. 
iii. The loan would force the Indian govt, to give 
special privileges to the private sector, including 
foreign investors; import subtituion policies will be 
reversed; New bilateral trade agreements with 
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socialist and other countries can not be accepted 
without prior clearance from the Fund; other 
external borrowing would be subjected to ceiling. 
iv. The Fund would also force the Indian govt, to 
curtailment of food subsidy and public distribution 
system (PDS); we might drift to a regime of 
perpetual inflation and perpetual balance of 
payment difficulties. 
V. Some of the policy measures like reduction in 
deficits and contraction in credit would effect the 
activities of the state govt, and of the small scale 
sector. 
vi. Liberal conditions for the use of foreign exchange 
would lead to greater access to the multinational 
co-operations in the Indian economy which would 
seriously jeopardies the a t tempts made by 
endogenous entrepreneurs for the development of 
technology. 
Similarly the latest borrowing by India from the IMF 
has been criticised mostly on the above noted grounds. 
But most of these criticism seems to be a little 
unjustified or highly exaggerated. Our analysis of IMF 
assistance to India has revealed that India's balance 
of payments difficulties on several occasions would have 
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intensified, had the Fund not come to her assistance 
in time of difficulties. The Fund does interfere but it 
cannot be called as the country's "sellout" to the Fund. 
Likewise the Fund insistence on adherence to fiscal 
discipline, reduction in unnecessary expenditure, cut in 
defence budget etc. cannot be regarded as 'humiliating". 
4 . 5 Concluding Remarks: 
To conclude, the rational behind India's borrowing 
from IMF has been to put Indian economy back on its 
track and the Fund has been helpful to India towards 
the realisation of this goal. 
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C O N C L U S I O N S 
The IMF came into existence in 1944 to sefeguard 
the global economy against the type of devastating 
break down that had occured in the 1930s. Since then 
it has worked consistently towards the a t ta inment of 
this goal and evolved in several important directions 
in response to changing conditions. 
During the first quarter century of its existence, the 
IMF oversaw the "par value system", served as a forum 
for consultation and collaboration and helped member 
countries correct short term balance of payment 
problems by lending them the foregin currencies they 
needed. But when in the early 1970s, the system of 
fixed but adjustable exchange rates was abandoned the 
IMF assumed "surveillance" role. To-day it is authorised 
not only to monitor the exchange rate policies of 
members but also their economic policites affecting 
exchange rates. 
In the 1960s , the IMF made two important changes 
in its operational policies namely the introduction of 
the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) to 
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supplement its financial resources in order to have 
enough cash on hand to meet the members ' borrowing 
needs and the creation of the Special Drawing Right 
(SDRs). The SDR was created to meet out the threat 
of a shortage of international liquidity. 
During the 1960s , the IMF also increased its 
attention to developing countries by introducing two 
new lending mechanism - the compensatory financing 
facility and the buffer stock facility. 
For deca tes , the Fund provided assistance to its 
member countries on a short term basis which was 
considered not sufficient enough for a borrowing 
nation to implment any effective monetary and 
economic plans . Hence the IMF introduced a new 
lending instrument, the Extended Fund Facility, in 
September 1974 , tailored to the medium term needs of 
the developing countries. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF's lending 
activities continued to expand. It established the 
structural Adjustment Facility in 1986 and the En-
tranced Structural Adjustment Facility in 1 9 8 8 . 
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Thus over the years, the IMF has made noticeable 
moves to respond to the needs of member countries 
in general and the developing countries in particular. 
It has paid greater attention to the least developed 
member countries since the second half of 1980s. 
India is a founder member of the IMF and has 
played an important role in the formulation of its 
policies. Its initial quota in the Fund was fixed at $400 
million which formed 5 per cent of the F u n d s total 
quota. India enjoyed fifth place in the Fund and was 
entitled to have a 'permanent" chair in the Executive 
Board and appoint its own Executive Director. But over 
the years India's position in the Fund has gone down 
reflecting its falling share in world rate, relatively low 
growth in GDP and low levels of foreign exchange 
India has borrowed Funds from the IMF on several 
occasions under different facilities during the period 
1947-48 to 1996-97. These have been used to 
overome the pressure on balance of payments position 
of the country. 
But the "conditionality" attached by the Fund has 
led to the criticism of India's borrowings from the IMF. 
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Our stdy indicates that in the absence of such 
assitance by the IMF, India's difficulties on the balance 
of payments front would have intensified and affected 
the country's growth adversely. Similarly the Fund's 
insistence on fiscal discipline, cut in defence and other 
unnecessary expenditures are essential for intrinsic 
wealth of the economy and cannot be regarded as 
'humiliating". 
90 
BOOKS 
Bhagwati, J.N. and Srinivasan T.N., Foreign Trade Regime 
and Economic Development: India. New York. 
1975. 
Bird, G. and Killick. T., The IMF and the Third World, 
Overseas Development Institute. London. 1982. 
Blownfield. A.I., Monetary Policy Under the International 
Gold Standard, New York. 1914. 
Brahmananda. P.R. IMF Loan and India's Economic 
Feature. The Himalaya Publishing House. 
Bombay. 1986. 
Croekett Andrew and Goldstein Morris. Strengthenting the 
International System: Exchange Rates 
Surveillance and Objective Indicators. IMF 
Washington D.C. Feb. (Occasional Paper No. 50). 
1987. 
Dutt. Ruddar and Sundaram. K.P.M.. Indian Economy. 
S.Chand & Co. New Delhi. 1998. 
Firtz. Machlup. Remarking the International Monetary 
System: The Rio Agreement and Bevound. John 
Hopkins Press. Baltimore. 1968. 
91 
Gold, Josheph, International Monetary Fund. Wahsington, 
1977. 
Grubel, H.G., World Monetary Reform- Plans and Issue. 
Standford, 1963. 
Gurumati, S., IMF and the Developing Countries - An 
Agenda for Reform. Vikas Publishing House. Pvt. 
Ltd. New Delhi, 1995. 
Guth. Wirld field and Levis, Arthur, International Monetary 
System in Operation. Washington, 1977. 
Horie Shigeo, The International Monetary Fund -
Retrospect and Prospect. Macmillan & Company 
Ltd., London, 1964. 
Horsefied. J.K.. The International Monetary Fund 1945-
6 1 . Washington, 1969. 
International Monetary Fund. Annual Reports of the 
Executive Board for the Financial Year ended 
April 30, Washington. D.C., IMF. 1946 to 1998. 
International Monetary Fund, Fund Commercial Bank, and 
Member Countries, Washington, (Occasional 
Paper No. 26). 1984. 
Mannur. H.G., International Economics. Second Edition. 
Vikas Publishing House. New Delhi. 1996. 
92 
Misra. S.K. and Puri, V.K., Indian Economy, Himalaya 
Publishing House, 1998. 
Moggridge, The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes. 
Activities 1940-44, London, 1980. 
Mundell, A. Robert and Jacques, J. Polak, The New 
International Monetary System, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1977. 
Nowzad, Bahram, International Monetary Fund. 
Washington, 1978. 
Peter Korner and Others, IMF and the Debt Crisis: A 
Guide to Third World Dilemma. 2nd Books Ltd.. 
London. 1987. 
Rizvi. A.R. IMF and its Credit Windows. National Book 
Organisation. New Delhi. 1996. 
Sainy. H.C.. India's Foreign Trade: Its Nature and 
Problems. New Delhi. 1979. 
Saxena, R.B.. IMF Loan to India: An Economic 
Assessment. Anmol Publications. Delhi. 1986. 
Simha. S.L.N.. International Monetary Reforms-An 
Introduction. Vora & Co.. Bombay. 1973. 
Singh. R.S.. IMF Policies Toward Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) with Special Reference to India. 
93 
Deep & Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1996. 
Soderson. B.O., International Economics. Macmillan, 
Hongkong, 1985, 
Sundram. K.P.M., An Introduction to International Trade 
and Foreign Exchange. New Delhi, 1971. 
ARTICLES 
Adhikari. Gautam, "IMF Loan not to Ease India's Economic 
Crisis", Times of India. 20 Nov. 1990, New 
Delhi. 
Banerjee Subrato. "No to IMF Loan". New Age. Vol. 39, No. 
March, 1991. 
Bhattacharya. A.K.. "IMF Wants India to Keep Broad 
Money Growth Under 10.5%". Economic Times. 
3 July. 1992. New Delhi. 
Bird. Graham. "Borrowing from IMF : The Policy Implication 
of Recent Emperical Research" World Development. 
Vol. 24, No. 11. November 1996. 
Budhoo. L. Davison Goa. "Enough is Enough". Journal of 
Education Planning & Adm. Vol. 9, No. 4, Oct. 
1995. 
C. Upendranath. "International Aid to Basic Needs and 
Education for all : The Indian Case. Journal of 
94 
Education Planning & Administration, Vol. 10, No. 1. 
January 96. 
Carl Jayarajah and Others, "Social Dimention of Adjustment : 
World Bank Experience. 1980-83" Journal of 
Education Planning & Administration, Vol. 10. No. 3. 
July. 1997. 
"Celebrating Fifty Years of the IMF", IMF Staff Paper, Vol. 24, 
No. 4, December, 1995, Washington. 
Chandauri, Ritrika, "Indian Economy: New IMF Rating 
Clouds Truth". Financial Express, 15 July. 1993, 
New Delhi. 
Chaudhari, Asok Kumar. "India & the IMF". A.I.C.C. Economic 
Review, Vol. 10. No. 22. 15 March. 1959. 
Das Gupta. Tapan. "IMF, World Bank Review Govt. 
Performance". Times of India. 13 February. 
1992. New Delhi. 
Ghosh. Arun. "Indias External Debt in Relation to the BoP 
Prospects". Economic & Political Weekly. Vol. 28. No. 
6, February 1993, Bombay. 
Ghosh. Arun, "Management of Economy and IMF 
Conditionalities", Economic and Political Weekly. 
4-11 January, 1992, Bombay. 
95 
Ghosh, Arun. "IMF borrowings, Some myths exposed". 
Economic & Political Weekly. 3-10 August 1991, 
Bombay. 
IMF and India; Editorial Economic Times 8 July, 1981, New 
Delhi. 
Jaganathan, N., "Indias Fiscal Problems & the World Bank (IMF 
& IDA)." Monthly Commentary on Indian Economic 
Conditions, Vol. 33, No. 4, November, 1991. 
Joshi K.N. "IMF and India's BoPs : An Analysis", Southern 
Economics, Vol. 33 No. 14, 15 November, 1994, 
Bangalore. 
Krishnan, N.K., "IMF Loan and its concequences". Party Life. 
Vol. 17, No. 22, 22 November, 1981. 
Kumar. Arun, "IMF loan and its implications". Monthly 
Commentary on Indian Economic Conditions. Vol. 
32 & 33 No. 12, July-Aug. 1991, Bangalore. 
Leuitt. Kari Polanyi, "IMF Structural Adjustment : Short-term 
Gain for Long-term Pain", Economic & Political 
Weekly. Vol. 27, No. 3, 18 January 1992, Bombay. 
Maheshwari S.C.. "Loan from the IMF : Is it a Red Rag". Estern 
Economic. Vol. 77. No. 18, 30 October, 1981, New 
Delhi. 
96 
Mehta Jaya. "IMF and Indian Economy". Main Stream. Vol 24, 
No. 40, 27 July, 1991, New Delhi. 
Misra & Sharma, "IMF Loan to India; Crisis and Opportunity", 
B.H.U. Journal of Social Science. Vol. 3. No 4. 
1982-83. Varanasi. 
Narottam Gaan. "Third World Debt Crisis: Solution & 
Challenges'" Foreign Affairs. May-June 1996 
Roy. R.K. "India. IMF and Conditionality". Economic Times. 
10 Aug. 1981. New Delhi. 
S. Anand Reddy & S. Mamtha. "The Burgeoning Burden 
of Interest Paymens-Some Policy Measures" 
Southern Economics. Vo. 36. No. 6. 15 July. 
1097. Bangalore. 
Sharma. Atul and Mehta. Pradeep Kumar. "Indias External Debt; 
Growth. Burden & Implications". Quarterly Economy. 
April-June. 1990. Cambridge. 
Sood P.S.. "India and IMF". Indian Finance 64(13). 26 Sept . 
1959 pp. 589-90 
Stauley Fischer. "Capital Account Liberalization and Role of 
IMF". Southern Economics. Vol. 36. No. 14. 15 Nov 
1997. Bangalore. 
97 
Subrahmanyam Ganti, "IMF and Developing Countries with 
Special Reference to India", Journal of Indian Institue 
of Bankers, Vol. 63, No. 3, July-September, 1993. 
Suri Kamla. "IMF Loan to India: Some Basic Issues", Economic 
Times. 18 November, 1981, New Delhi. 
JOURNALS. REPORTS AND NEWS PAPERS ETC. 
American Economic Review. Nashville. USA. 
Basic Statistical Realitinq to Indian Economy Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy. Bombay. 
Commerce. Bombay. 
Eastern Economics. New Delhi. 
Economic and Political Weekly. Bombay. 
Economic Survey. New Delhi. 
Europe Year World Book. Washington 
Financial Express. New Delhi. 
Foreign Trade Bulletin. New Delhi. 
Foreign Trade Review. New Delhi. 
Government of India Planning Commission Planned 
Documents From, First to Eight Five Year Plans. 
New Delhi. 
Indian Economic Journal. Bombay-
Indian Journal of Economics. Allahabad 
98 
Indian Journal of Labour Economics, Lucknow 
International Monetary Fund Annual Reports. Washington 
D.C. 
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. 
International Mounetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics-
Journal of Economic Perspective-
Journal of Industrial Economics. Oxford 
Journal of the Institute of Economics-
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Cambridge. 
RBI Bulletin. Bombay -
Review of Economics and Statistics. Cambridge^ 
Sourthern Economist. Banglore 
The Economic Times. New Delhi. 
World Bank Annual Report 
Yoiana. New Delhi 
1 
